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defendant had notice of the setoff prior to notice of the assignment.
Whether it had in fact existed prior to the assignment was not
examined by the court.""8 Rather, the court indicated, somewhat
inaccurately, that,
an assignee is subject to setoffs available against the assignor whenever
the setoffs are based on facts existing prior to knowledge by the obligor
179
of the assignment.

The court failed to cite Talcott and, in addition, indicated that its
statement was inconsistent with CPLR 3019(c) 1o and with

several prior decisions.' 81
Although the decision would not have been altered by a
proper pronouncement of the court, such inaccuracy must be
indicated. Imprecise dicta can only serve to confuse practitioners
as to the exact nature of the setoff counterclaim.
Reply allowed to state what appears to be a counterclaim.

A reply is the pleading, designated by CPLR 3011, to be
A reply may also be
served in response to a counterclaim.
required, in other circumstances,' 82 by court order.8 3 It has
been firmly established that only defenses and denials may be
84
pleaded in a reply regardless of why the reply was served.
178 "The Court need not decide, and the record does not establish, whether
the bonds [from which transaction the setoff arose] were delivered to Arlee
before or after receipt of the securities from, and delivery of the check to,
Meadow Brook on May 26, although both events took place on the same
day. The important fact is that it was not until after delivery of bonds
• . . that it was revealed to the broker [defendant] that Chatham [plaintiff]
•

. .

had obtained an interest in its principal's securities." Ibid.

17 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
18o Ibid.

181 Fera v. Wickham, 135 N.Y. 223, 31 N.E. 1028 (1892); Michigan
Say. Bank v. Millar, 110 App. Div. 670, 96 N.Y. Supp. 568 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
606, 79 N.E. 1111 (1906).
186 N.Y.
182 An affirmative defense may be one such circumstance. E.g., Palmer v.
Anderson, 243 App. Div. 618, 276 N.Y. Supp. 478 (2d Dep't 1935).
183 CPLR 3011.
See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Corn Exch. Bank,
73 Hun 78, 25 N.Y. Supp. 1068 (Sup. Ct 1893).
184 Although the provisions of the procedure statutes have not explicitly
restricted the inclusion of counterclaims in a reply, courts have never been
hesitant to infer this restriction. The restriction was present under the
Code of Civil Procedure § 514 as illustrated in Cohn v. Husson, 66 How.
Pr. 150 (N.Y. City Ct 1883). In Seligmann v. Mandel, 19 Misc. 2d 418,
190 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1959), the court held that under CPA §272,
counterclaims were not includible in a reply. The provisions of CPA § 272
are now embodied in Sections 3011, 3014 and 3018(a) of the CPLI. This
division has not changed the policy of excluding counterclaims. See, e.g.,
Habiby v. Habiby, - App. Div. 2d -, 256 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1st Dep't 1965);
In re Cohen (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) 150 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1963, p. 12,
col. 4.
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A counterclaim therefore may never appear in a reply. If a
counterclaim could be asserted in a reply, in essence, the court
would be allowing the amendment of the complaint without compelling plaintiff to comply with the requisites of such amendment.
The rule then is clear. Its application, however, can get
somewhat imprecise, since it may be difficult to distinguish between
a counterclaim 18s and an affirmative defense which may always be
included in a reply.
86
This problem is reflected in Rill v. Darling.'
In Rill the
plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the death of her
husband which, she claimed, was accelerated by defendant's negligence. Defendant's answer alleged a release from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff replied admitting the release, but asked the court to rescind
the agreement.
Plaintiff's claim for rescission in the reply was unchallenged.
Since rescission is an equitable cause of action the plaintiff asserted
a counterclaim.
Apparently defendant's counsel did not object to the reply.
The issue of the case then became the right of the defendant to
have the question of rescission tried by a jury. However, that
issue need never have been reached had defendant's counsel moved
to dismiss the reply for stating a counterclaim.
Amendnent to pleading refused when substantial prejudice results.
CPLR 3025(b), which requires that leave to amend be freely
given, does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion
and denying a defendant's motion for leave to amend his answer.
7
So held the court in Ciccone v. Glenwood Holding Corp.,""
where
plaintiff, a tenant in defendant's building, alleged that she was
injured in December 1961 by a ceiling which collapsed. A complaint was served in February 1963 and in April 1963 defendant
interposed an answer. Defendant moved in August 1964 for leave
to amend his answer so that he could allege that plaintiff was
in his employ at the time of the accident and could, therefore,
receive workmen's compensation. The court denied the defendant's
motion to amend, indicating that plaintiff's right to workmen's
compensation was lost since an action therefor must be brought
within two years of an accident."""
This decision is based upon a firm foundation of cases 1s
which indicate that freedom to amend pleadings is bridled by the
5A counterclaim must state a cause of action.
Misc. 2d 174, 253 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct 1964).
Misc. 2d 273, 253 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct 1964).
21898 N.Y.
WoRK~mq's ComP. LAW § 28.
See, e.g., Zulinsky v. Bradford, 279 App. Div. 765, 108 N.Y.S.2d
756 (2d Dep't 1951); Jennings v. Perkins, 277 App. Div. 1143, 101 N.Y.S.2d
303 (2d Dep't 1950).
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